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Frank B. Strickland
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether Congress may, pursuant to its limited and enumerated authority
“to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” mandate that individuals
who do not want to engage in commerce must enter into specified insurance
contracts with third parties.
2. Whether unconstitutional provisions of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act are severable from the remainder of the Act.

2

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Heritage Foundation (Heritage) is a District of Columbia nonpartisan,
nonprofit research institute that is recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code, with the mission “to formulate and promote
conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited
government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national
defense.”
Soon after its inception in 1973, Heritage’s domestic policy scholars began
analyzing, and educating policymakers and the public about, health policy issues
and proposals for health policy reform. In several publications and statements over
the last decade, Heritage health policy experts have opposed on purely policy
grounds a government-enforced mandate that individuals or families buy health
insurance. In its opening brief in this Court, the United States quotes a 21-year-old
lecture by a Heritage policy expert supporting a government-enforced mandate.
Because the United States has made an issue of Heritage’s policy position and left
a potentially misleading impression of its current position, Heritage has a strong
interest in explaining to this Court why its health policy experts have concluded
that an insurance mandate is unnecessary to expand health coverage significantly
and, indeed, is highly undesirable.

3

Since the creation of its Center for Legal & Judicial Studies (Legal Center)
in 2000, Heritage also has played a leading role analyzing the constitutionality and
legal implications of various public policy proposals. In December 2009,
Heritage’s Legal Center published an 18-page Legal Memorandum examining the
constitutionality of the “individual mandate” provision in the then-pending health
care bill.1 The Legal Memorandum suggested there were several constitutional
means to increase health care coverage, but noted the costly implications of the
individual mandate then being debated, and concluded that it would be
unconstitutional as drafted. Several Members of Congress relied on Heritage’s
Legal Memorandum in debates over the constitutionality of the pending bill and
entered it into the Congressional Record. Since that time, Heritage legal scholars
have remained active in commenting on and educating the public about the
unconstitutional nature of the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148 (2010), as amended (PPACA).

1

Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart, and Todd Gaziano, Why the Personal Mandate
to Buy Health Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 49 (Dec. 9, 2009).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its merits brief before this Court, the United States quotes a 21-year-old
statement by a Heritage policy expert supporting the need for a household
insurance mandate.2 If citations to policy papers were subject to the same rules as
legal citations, then the Heritage position quoted by the Department of Justice
would have a red flag indicating it had been reversed. Not only was the policy
statement taken somewhat out of context (the author in 1989 conditioned such a
mandate on tax reform and tax savings provided to families to fully or partially
offset the cost of the insurance), but Heritage has stopped supporting any insurance
mandate.
Heritage policy experts never supported an unqualified mandate like that in
the PPACA. Their prior support for a qualified mandate was limited to
catastrophic coverage (true insurance that is precisely what the PPACA forbids),
coupled with tax relief for all families and other reforms that are conspicuously
absent from the PPACA. Since then, a growing body of research has provided a
strong basis to conclude that any government insurance mandate is not only
unnecessary, but is a bad policy option. Moreover, Heritage’s legal scholars have
been consistent in explaining that the type of mandate in the PPACA is
2

See Brief for Appellants at 37, quoting Stuart M. Butler, The Heritage Lectures
218: Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
LECTURE NO. 218, at 6 (1989).
5

unconstitutional.3 In short, The Heritage Foundation opposes the PPACA
individual mandate as unwise policy and as unconstitutional legislation.
Although the government quotes lectures from 1989 as if the state of
economic and policy research is static, that is never the case. The truth is always
much more valuable and interesting. Empirical and other policy research in the
past two decades—and relevant legal analysis—confirm what in fact was always
the case: (1) health insurance individual mandates will fail and are bad public
policy; and (2) the federal government’s attempt to force private citizens to
purchase health insurance in the PPACA is unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY
It is difficult to understand why the United States would, in a brief putatively
discussing the constitutionality of the insurance mandate, quote a 21-year-old
policy statement which was abandoned and subsequently called a “serious
mistake” by the institutional issuers of that statement,4 and which, far from
answering the question presented to this Court, did not in 1989 consider any
3

See, e.g., Barnett, supra, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 49;
Todd Gaziano and Elizabeth Garvey, The Expansion of National Power at the
Expense of Individual Liberty, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ABC-CLIO (2011).

4

Nina Owcharenko and Robert E. Moffit, The Massachusetts Health Plan:
Lessons for the States, HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER NO. 1953, at 3
(July 18, 2006). See also Robert E. Moffit, Choice and Consequences: Transparent
Alternatives to The Individual Insurance Mandate, 9 HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV.
223, 226 (2008).
6

constitutional question. Whatever the government’s purpose, Heritage thinks
resorting to abandoned and empirically repudiated ideas from another era is a sign
of desperation and highlights the impotence of Appellants’ current policy
argument.
I.

Current Policy Research Demonstrates That An Insurance
Mandate Carries Steep Costs, Is Unnecessary And Undesirable.

Heritage’s health policy scholars relied on economic, behavioral, empirical,
and philosophical grounds in rejecting an individual mandate.5 Because the United
States relies on a Heritage’s policy lecture from more than two decades ago (and
takes it out of context), the Court should benefit from understanding how
Heritage’s original position differed from the individual mandate in the PPACA,
and more importantly, the compelling reasons that led Heritage policy experts to
reject any type of individual mandate altogether.
In an effort to promote a stable and more affordable health care market,
policymakers have long struggled to deal with competing market forces (including
government-created distortions to the market). Two challenges to consumer-based
reforms are: (a) adverse-selection effects, in which healthy individuals choose not
to purchase insurance coverage, leading to increased premiums for others and
5

The views of Heritage’s policy experts on an insurance mandate were unrelated
to any constitutional analysis until recently because they are not trained in the law
and Heritage’s Legal Center was not created until 2000 to provide complex legal
analysis.
7

causing some of these others to leave the marketplace; and (b) the “free rider”
problem, where those who do not purchase coverage can still obtain care at others’
expense, including costly emergency room care based on legal obligations on
participants in federal programs, see, e.g., Hospital Survey and Construction Act,
42 U.S.C. § 291, et seq. (1946); Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986).
Though extant before then, the idea of a health insurance mandate gained
traction in the late 1980s when federal programs helped push health care costs
sharply upward. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, Republicans Spurn Once-Favored Health
Mandate, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Feb.15, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123670612 (quoting Mark
Pauly on the group of “economists and health policy people” who helped promote
the idea in the late 1980s); Randall R. Bovbjerg and William G. Kopit, Coverage
and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REV.
857, 909 (1986).
Although Heritage never supported a PPACA-style mandate, and has since
changed its policy position to oppose all mandates, Heritage health care experts
previously (albeit mistakenly) accepted the view that a limited insurance mandate
might be necessary to address these market and government-created effects. Their
proposals differed in at least two significant ways from the type of mandate
8

employed in the PPACA: (a) Heritage scholars always conditioned their support
for an insurance mandate on fundamental tax reform that would provide direct tax
relief to households to offset the cost of the insurance and on other reforms that are
also conspicuously absent from the PPACA, and (b) their policy statements also
make clear that such a mandate should only require coverage for “catastrophic”
injuries or illnesses. Heritage argued that individuals should pay for routine care
out of pocket. Not only does the PPACA not embrace these limits, it prohibits
catastrophic-only policies, excepting only those programs which meet stringent
grandfathering requirements.6
Heritage policy experts have been involved in the debate over mandates for
many years, but its own research contributed to the growing consensus among
market-based economists and health policy experts that such a mandate is not
necessary to achieve a high level of coverage and will never produce the mythical
“universal” coverage that its advocates desire.7 In some prior years, Heritage
scholars have occasionally used the term “soft mandate,” or similar language, but
6

See Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1302(c)(1) and 26 U.S.C. §5000(A)(f)(1)(D), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1501(b).
7

In contrast, the government’s reliance on a 21-year-old policy lecture seems to
suggest a belief that anyone who was interested in any form of insurance mandate
in 1989 should love the PPACA mandate today. That is like arguing that any
medical researcher who expressed qualified support for one therapy 21 years ago
should naturally favor a broader application of that therapy today, even if his own
and other research has disproven the assumptions that supported the original
approach.
9

even a cursory reading of their articles reveals that they were not advocating a
PPACA-style mandate, and most often were referring to proposals for automatic
enrollment with an opt-out provision or tax credits to induce voluntary
participation.8
But support for any mandate is unwarranted, even some that may be termed
“soft mandates” by others. Recent policy research has increasingly confirmed that
a government-enforced mandate to buy health insurance is not only philosophically
troubling, but also bad policy for a number of reasons. First, breakthroughs in
behavioral economics strengthened the argument for alternative approaches. For
example, research on automatic enrollment for retirement savings provided
important empirical evidence that a mandate was not necessary to significantly
increase participation rates. A study of pension contributions at a major
corporation utilizing automatic enrollment with opt-out procedures led to
impressive results: automatic enrollment procedures resulted in an increase of
participation from 61% to 86%, besting other attempts to increase participation,
such as employer-provided financial education or even increasing the employer

8

For example, in 2003, Stuart Butler testified before the U.S. Senate Special
Committee on Aging and supported using a “soft mandate,” which could include
losing tax benefits, instead of a “hard mandate,” which would make the failure to
obtain coverage illegal. In Critical Condition: America’s Ailing Health Care
System, Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 68-81
(2003) (statement of Stuart M. Butler).
10

match. Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia
in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7682 (2000).
Moreover, Madrian and Shea found that automatic enrollment greatly
increased the participation of employees who otherwise were less likely to enroll in
the pension program, including younger employees. Id. at 24. These and other
studies led Heritage experts to conclude that “[w]ith modifications, a similar
process [to automatic pensions enrollment], including enrollment in a ‘default’
health plan, could be replicated with health insurance, thus dramatically reducing
the adverse selection that the individual mandate is designed to remedy.” Robert E.
Moffit, Choice and Consequences: Transparent Alternatives to the Individual
Insurance Mandate, 9 HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. 223, 229 (2008).
Second, research on the experience with other mandates, including auto
insurance, income tax filing, and draft registration, showed that they fall well short
of achieving universal compliance. Accordingly, the individual mandate for health
insurance was likely to fail, even if one accepted as desirable the goal of universal
coverage. Heritage’s Robert Moffit later explained in the Harvard Health Policy
Review that the mandate’s price in lost liberty would be too high, especially if it
was no better at achieving universal coverage than other, more consumer-friendly
means. “On philosophical grounds, policymakers should retain a bias for personal
11

liberty.” Moffitt, supra, 9 HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. at 226. Moffit argued
instead for practical alternatives based on personal responsibility that would
produce high coverage rates and would interfere with the market and individual
liberty less.
Third, mandates increase the expense of coverage for many of the uninsured
that they are purported to help. For example, the PPACA requires not only the
purchase of coverage, but expansive coverage, precluding lower-cost plans. The
PPACA also requires insurers to compress the ratio of ratings between younger
and older enrollees. This leads to higher premiums, particularly for the younger
and healthier employees—the very people that mandates purport to be forcing into
the insurance pool. See Robert E. Moffitt, Obamacare and the Individual Mandate:
Violating Personal Liberty and Federalism, HERITAGE FOUNDATION WEBMEMO
NO. 3103 (Jan. 18, 2011). And other major expense drivers for the cost of the
provision of health care, like the widespread practice of defensive medicine (i.e.,
over-testing and over-treatment) in response to large non-economic damage awards
in medical malpractice suits, are completely unaddressed by a mandate, or
effectively, by anything else in PPACA.9

9

See, e.g., Bill G. Batchelder et al., Tort Reform in the States: Protecting
Consumers and Enhancing Economic Growth, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LECTURE
NO. 1152 (Sept. 18, 2009).
12

Fourth, these increased costs for insurance may worsen the adverse selection
problem. Because insurance carriers are required under PPACA to provide
coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions, and because the penalty on
individuals for failing to purchase coverage is relatively light compared to the
increased premium costs, individuals will “have every incentive to pay the light
penalty and sign up for insurance if they get sick and drop out of coverage when
they get well. This will induce a severe case of adverse selection, as the less stable
pools are disproportionately populated with older and sicker enrollees, resulting in
a deadly cost spiral.” Id. In an attempt to solve a comparatively mild adverse
selection problem in the current market, a mandate, when coupled with other
regulations that raise costs, such as those in the PPACA, actually increases the
adverse selection problem to the point that it may threaten the viability of the
health care market.
Fifth, mandates coupled with minimum benefits requirements, which restrict
the availability of levels of coverage or types of insurance (for example, some
high-deductible coverage or limited benefit plans) greatly reduce consumer choice.
Some of the plans that are or likely are restricted under PPACA are among the
most cost-effective and desirable for the uninsured. Consumer choice is an element
of individual liberty to determine one’s own health care plan. Mandates like the

13

one in PPACA limit choice, and do so in ways that are counterproductive to the
goal of providing optimal insurance to consumers at competitive prices.
Based on this and other research, Heritage policy experts have actively
challenged the notion that an individual insurance mandate is necessary to solve
the adverse selection or free-rider problem, and have instead worked to show better
ways to do so. Moreover, the policy research and analysis discussed in the
preceding paragraphs strongly suggests that the mandate in the PPACA is not even
conducive to those ends. Thus, while Heritage analysts once supported a limited
and qualified insurance mandate, at no time did they advocate a PPACA-style
mandate. More importantly, mandates are not necessary to provide broad-based
insurance coverage; this goal can be met more effectively through other means
which are market-based and do not infringe individual liberty. Thus, mandates—
particularly inflexible mandates like the one found in the PPACA—are bad public
policy.
II.

Heritage Has Consistently Explained That A PPACA-Style
Mandate Is Unconstitutional.

Although Heritage’s first serious legal analysis of the PPACA was not
published until late 2009, its view on the limits of Congress’s Commerce power
has been known for years. Heritage’s Legal Center has consistently articulated the
position that the Commerce Clause does not transform a national government of

14

limited and enumerated powers into one of limitless authority.10 Moreover,
Heritage legal fellows have applied this principle consistently, expressing
constitutional doubts about provisions in several bills supported on policy grounds
by many conservative constituencies.11
Soon after congressional sponsors articulated the plan for what became the
insurance mandate in the PPACA—one in which Congress simply mandated
individuals to purchase an insurance policy from third parties at inflated prices
based on claims of power under article I, section 8 power to regulate interstate
commerce and, some argue, its authority to levy certain taxes—Heritage legal
10

See, e.g., Todd Gaziano and Elizabeth Garvey, The Expansion of National
Power at the Expense of Individual Liberty, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ABC-CLIO
(2011); Brian Walsh and Benjamin Keane, Overcriminalization and the
Constitution, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 64 (April 13,
2011) (raising constitutional concerns about various federal crime proposals); Hans
A. von Spakovsky, Congress Must Now Address Civil Justice Reform to Impact
Health Care, HEALTH REFORM REPORT (Jan. 20, 2011) (noting that Congress
cannot establish medical malpractice caps directly even though that is a desirable
state tort reform goal for providers in federal healthcare programs); Andrew
Grossman, The Enumerated Powers Act: A First Step Toward Constitutional
Government, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 41 (June 23,
2009); Brian Walsh and Andrew Grossman, Human Trafficking Reauthorization
Would Undermine Existing Anti-Trafficking Efforts and Constitutional Federalism,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 21 (Feb. 14, 2008) (voicing
constitutional doubt about federal anti-prostitution proposals); Erica Little and
Brian Walsh, The Gang Abatement and Prevention Act: A Counterproductive and
Unconstitutional Intrusion into State and Local Responsibilities, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION WEBMEMO NO.1619 (Sept. 17, 2007) (raising constitutional doubt
about certain federal proposals to target gang violence).
11

The papers discussed in the preceding footnote with parenthetical notes are good
examples.
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scholars expressed the unequivocal position that Congress had no power to impose
such a mandate. In short, Heritage scholars explained that the mandate would be
unconstitutional.
Heritage’s first formal legal analysis of the individual mandate in the
PPACA was an 18-page Legal Memorandum published in December 2009, and its
title expresses its simple conclusion. See Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart, and
Todd Gaziano, Why the Personal Mandate to Buy Health Insurance Is
Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL
MEMORANDUM NO. 49 (Dec. 9, 2009). The main purpose of this brief is not to reargue the merits of the issue before this Court—that job is being ably performed by
the States and the NFIB—but to refute the notion that Heritage or other faithful
constitutional scholars could defend an individual mandate like that in the PPACA.
Unlike some in Congress who advocated passing the bill and then
discovering what it contained, the authors of the Heritage Legal Memorandum
carefully studied the bill’s provisions and relevant legal authorities. The Heritage
Legal Memorandum conceded that certain health care proposals which are abysmal
public policies and which would do tremendous damage to core societal interests—
most notably, a compulsory, single-payer system—may nonetheless pass
constitutional muster in the courts. Id. at 12 (“[T]he courts may well allow
Congress to use its taxing and spending powers to craft a general income tax
16

sufficient to pay for health care insurance for more Americans.”). Accordingly,
how the federal government implemented an individual mandate was integral to the
authors’ legal analysis.12
The principle that “the means matter” not only respects the Constitution’s
actual text (it is not merely a font of aspirations), but it is one endorsed time-andagain by the Supreme Court: Just because government may achieve a policy
objective utilizing one means authorized by one enumerated power does not mean
that it can accomplish the same object using any means. See Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (acknowledging the potential authority to condition
funds on state and local officials performing specified functions, but rejecting
congressional attempts to commandeer or mandate the same compliance).
Co-authored by prominent outside legal scholars and the Director of
Heritage’s Legal Center, the Legal Memorandum briefly noted the bad policy
implications of the individual mandate. Its authors then concluded after carefully
reviewing the constitutional text and court precedents that this unprecedented
mandate on citizens (who wish to do nothing) to engage in a particular commercial
transaction would bend the Commerce Clause to the point of breaking:

12

The Legal Memorandum correctly noted that “[s]hould it adopt any of these
constitutional taxing and spending measures, Congress would have to incur the
political costs arising from increasing the income tax.…” Id. at 12.
17

To uphold the insurance purchase mandate, the Supreme Court would
have to concede that the Commerce Clause has no limits, a
proposition that it has never affirmed, that it rejected in Lopez and
Morrison, and from which it did not retreat in Raich. Although
Congress may possibly regulate the operations of health care or health
insurance companies directly, given that they are economic activities
with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, it may not regulate
the individual’s decision not to purchase a service or enter into a
contract. If Congress can mandate this, then it can mandate anything.
Id. at Executive Summary 2.
During the debate over the PPACA, Heritage’s Legal Memorandum was
entered into the Congressional Record twice in support of constitutional points of
order raised by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and John Ensign (R-NV), 111 CONG.
REC. S13015 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); 111 CONG.
REC. S13723 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. John Ensign), and was
prominently discussed in support of Rep. Steve Scalise’s amendment to repeal the
individual mandate, 111 CONG. REC. D311 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2010). Heritage’s
legal analysis was also reprinted or cited in leading national newspapers and in
numerous other prominent, national publications.13

13

The Wall Street Journal republished the entire Legal Memorandum on Dec. 23,
2009. See also Ben Pershing, Some foes of health-care bill hope courts will stop
legislation, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2010; Randy Barnett, Outlook: Is health-care
reform unconstitutional? WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2010 (quoting portions of the
Legal Memorandum); No mandate for government health care, WASH. TIMES,
Dec.18, 2009.
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Given the entry of its Legal Memorandum into the Congressional Record
during the debates over the bill, and prominent citations in the popular press, it is
reasonable to infer that the United States and others should be well aware of
Heritage’s position objecting to the specific insurance mandate in the PPACA—as
both bad policy and as an unconstitutional exercise of government power. Yet the
government’s selective quote from a 21-year-old lecture may nevertheless lead to
the incorrect inference regarding Heritage’s current position and the state of policy
research generally. Whatever else, it seems like a sign of desperation from a
government with little policy or legal cover.
CONCLUSION
Heritage’s empirical and other health policy research and its uniform
constitutional analysis are mutually reinforcing and point in the same direction.
The policy literature is clear: individual mandates are not necessary to provide
broad-based coverage, and the individual mandate in the PPACA is unsound
policy. It also violates the U.S. Constitution. For the reasons set forth above,
Heritage respectfully requests this Court to take notice of its actual position
opposing individual mandates—a position quite different from the one Appellants
quote in their opening brief. Consistent with Heritage’s actual views, the court
should affirm the judgment of the district court in appeal No. 11-11021.
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